Unanswered Questions

Nicholas Kristof has jumped on the moral psychology bandwagon and thrown his twenty-two cents into the ring (accounting for inflation).

I still have some issues with Haidt's analysis, although if you've read any of my earlier posts, you know I think he's onto something big. Part of my problem is with Kristof's piece has much to do with journalistic oversimplification I'm sure, but take this statement for instance:

One of the main divides between left and right is the dependence on different moral values. For liberals, morality derives mostly from fairness and prevention of harm. For conservatives, morality also involves upholding authority and loyalty — and revulsion at disgust.

Aside from the odd idea of someone not having "revulsion at disgust" (isn't someone who is disgusted by definition also subject to revulsion?), I take issue with the notion that liberals are not also subject to moral disgust, or at least behave as though they are. I have had a number of exceedingly liberal friends who have behaved as though I have leprosy when I express skepticism at the ultimate goodness of same-sex marriage, for example.

A quick tour of any of the far-Left websites or an op/ed column by Frank Rich will show you something similar. Or take the video of a handful of McCain supporters walking through the Upper West Side of Manhattan last fall. If this isn't the product of disgust, I'm not sure I understand what the operative definition of "disgust" is.

The other questions that arise come from statements like this:

The larger point is that liberals and conservatives often form judgments through flash intuitions that aren’t a result of a deliberative process.

Really? All of our judgments are formed in the moment and undergo no cognitive development whatsoever? I know that Haidt doesn't believe this, but his journalistic summarizers do. So there appear to be underlying correlatives of particular moral and political beliefs? Well, which way does the causation run, or is there a third factor of causation that isn't being considered? What about beliefs that change over time? How does that happen? Virtue ethics may be the key here--a subject that I know Haidt finds intriguing--but it receives no mention from Kristof.

Also this:

A study by Diana Mutz of the University of Pennsylvania found that when people saw tight television shots of blowhards with whom they disagreed, they felt that the other side was even less legitimate than before.

Well, of course! If you expose someone to a belief system being presented by someone in whom he or she has placed little or no epistemic trust, why would such a person be expected to moderate his or her beliefs?

Like I said, Haidt is definitely onto something, but it needs more empirical study, and less armchair boiled-down oversimplification. Luckily, given the rise in interest among academics (and journalists) in the subject matter, it's likely to get it.